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Darryl Francis: Maverick




arryl Francis retired from this Reserve
Bank almost a quarter century ago, but his
imprint on the culture and reputation of
the Bank endures to the present time. Before I left
the Bank, and for some time after, people would
ask about him and I found that all immediately
understood when I answered, “Darryl is the
Harry Truman of the Federal Reserve.”
I don’t know what it is about someone with a
rural background, and a disarmingly friendly
nature, from the “Show Me State” that causes him
to be so clear minded and resolute in his convic-
tions. Both for himself and his staff, Darryl lived
true to the expression, “First be sure you are right,
then go ahead.” This fostered the ideal atmosphere
for a balanced emphasis on economic theory and
empirical research.
Darryl Francis was already president of this
Bank when I joined the research staff at the invita-
tion of Homer Jones, its venerable research director.
For any Reserve Bank economist captivated by
monetary policy issues, the nature of the Bank’s
president is bound to be a crucial matter. In my
case, Darryl Francis nurtured the ideal environment
for someone in transition from academic studies to
hands-on policy advising. In addition to monetary
policy, Darryl was interested in the effectiveness
and efficiency of all aspects of our central bank
mission.
A couple of years after I came here, he sent
me off into exile to run the data processing and
other departments. Exile was not punishment, rest
assured, but it was in the nature of missionary
work on behalf of economists, among others. At
that time computers scarcely had surfaced in
System research departments. The Banks’ com-
puters were used for processing checks and
accounting records, and their design would have
to be rethought in the light of growing demands to
run regressions, maintain data banks, and, poten-
tially, operate the increasingly popular large models
of the economy. These models, containing hun-
dreds of equations, were making inroads with the
Board of Governors’ research staff, who were
hoping to assist in formulating and implementing
monetary policy by opening many of the black
boxes that connect monetary and fiscal policy
tools to the ultimate objectives.
As everyone knows, St. Louis did not follow
the Board down the path of gargantuan models of
the economy. Instead, we focused on direct empir-
ical tests of rival conjectures about monetary and
fiscal impulses, as exemplified by what became
known as the St. Louis model, which is associated
with an article that Leonall Andersen and I pub-
lished in the Bank’s Review in 1968.
Darryl Francis was indeed a monetary policy
maverick. But let me first explain the sense in
which I use the term “maverick,” for the word has
several meanings. The old Webster’s unabridged
dictionary in the Cleveland Reserve Bank library
explains that the word can be traced to one Sam
Maverick, a Texas rancher of the mid-nineteenth
century who refused to brand his cattle. On that
account, unbranded, stray cattle came to be called
“mavericks” and were considered the property of
the first person who branded them. Clearly, this is
not my meaning. Darryl Francis never allowed
himself to be appropriated and branded by any
person or group.
The second dictionary definition of maverick is
simply a person who has “escaped from the herd.”
This, too, is not my meaning. Darryl Francis did, in
fact, escape from the Federal Reserve herd in 1949
to spend five years in private sector banking. But
then he rejoined the Fed in 1953 and remained
until he had spent 10 years leading the St. Louis
herd as president of this Bank.
A third definition comes closer to my intended
usage: “an independent,” but a fourth hits the nail
on the head. This defines a maverick as “an inde-
pendent individual who refuses to conform with
his group.”
Now, some might say that Darryl Francis was a
conformist, not a maverick. That is, he conformed
to the image of St. Louis Reserve Bank presidents
as mavericks, for he was not the first. Delos C. Johns,
president of this Bank from 1951 to 1962, is said
to have been chosen for the job in part because he
could be counted on to nettle William McChesney
Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Governors and
of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
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from 1951 until 1970. McChesney Martin himself,
of course, started his career as an examiner here
at the St. Louis Fed. Even earlier than that, accord-
ing to Milton Friedman, Chairman Martin’s father,
William McChesney Martin, Sr., displayed a
maverick’s instinct in open market committee
meetings while he was governor of this Bank from
1929 to 1941. But I digress. 
Foremost among the groups with which Darryl
Francis refused to conform, of course, was the
FOMC. His record is clear. He participated in well
over one hundred FOMC meetings and was a
voting member of the Committee for three years
in this Bank’s rotation with the Atlanta and Dallas
Reserve Banks. During those voting periods of
1967-68, 1970-71, and 1973-74, he dissented from
the Committee’s decision more than one-third of
the time, at 13 meetings. More than that, he was
alone is his dissents on 8 of those 13 occasions.
This is a brave man.
Darryl became president of the Bank in
January of 1966, but he didn’t become a voting
member of the Committee until March of 1967.
By the time of his third vote, at the May meeting,
he struck out on the path he was to follow for the
remainder of his term as president. He dissented—
alone among the 12 members of the Committee—
in favor of what history surely must judge to have
been a better direction than the other members
chose. He dissented three more times in that first
voting year, each time arguing that the Committee’s
anticipated paths of money and bank credit were
more expansionary than would be consistent with
an already expansionary fiscal policy and with
the renewed economic expansion that could be
expected that year and thereafter. 
It would have been difficult to engage the
Committee in a meaningful discussion of this
alternative point of view because the members
displayed no visible commitment to a common
strategic target such as maintaining a stable pur-
chasing power of the dollar. This “incoherence,” as
Bill Poole recently called it, shows through in the
directives to the trading desk for the conduct of
monetary policy during inter-meeting periods. They
simply reflected the news of the day, evolving from
meeting to meeting. 
The policy of the first meeting of 1967 was
to be “conducive to non-inflationary economic
expansion while recognizing the need for progress
toward reasonable equilibrium in the country’s
balance of payments.” The next three meetings
sought to be “conducive to combating the effects
of weakening tendencies in the economy.” At the
May meeting the Committee wanted to be “con-
ducive to renewed economic expansion.” In July,
“renewed” became “continuing” and the balance
of payments concern for the remainder of the
calendar year became “recognizing the need for
reasonable price stability for both domestic and
balance of payments purposes.” In August, the
Committee switched from “continuing” economic
expansion to “sustainable” economic expansion. 
By the time of the November 1967 meeting,
inflation was taking its toll on the viability of the
dollar exchange standard and the Bretton Woods
international monetary system. The British had
devalued the pound sterling by 50 percent, the
President of the United States was compelled to
publicly reiterate that the United States intended
to maintain the $35-per-ounce peg to gold, and
the Fed had raised the discount rate half a percent.
The Committee described this as a period of mar-
ket “turbulence” and gave no pretence of strategic
objective. It merely stated a desire to facilitate
orderly adjustments to the increased discount rate.
A month later, the Committee changed course
again, stating its policy was to “foster financial
conditions conducive to resistance of inflationary
pressures and progress toward reasonable equilib-
rium in the country’s balance of payments.” In
January 1968, resisting inflationary pressures
remained, but the policy went back to “progress
toward reasonable equilibrium in the country’s
balance of payments.”
I have a sense of déjà vu when I compare FOMC
post-meeting press releases of 1997 through 1999
with the directives of 1967 and 1968, for they both
simply describe the evolving reaction of the Com-
mittee to incoming information. In that earlier
period, the Committee apparently had become so
accustomed to the post-Accord experience of price
stability that they simply assumed it would take
care of itself while they tried to fine-tune the econ-
omy. Meanwhile, the rest of the world began to
pile up unwanted dollar balances.
Such policy incoherence must be avoided today,
and—as of the beginning of 2000—the FOMC has
tried to avoid it by changing the content of its press
releases. Each release now reminds both the Com-
mittee and the public of its continuing strategic
policy objective, stating, “Against the background
of its long-run goals of price stability and sustain-
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currently available, the Committee believes” what-
ever it decides to say about the period until its
next meeting.
When Darryl started his second tour of duty
as a voting member of the Committee, Arthur Burns
had become Chairman just the month before. The
directive began to show signs that Darryl was no
longer alone in his concern for a more strategic
approach to policy decisions. The objectives of
the Committee, as stated in the directive, remained
unchanged from meeting to meeting: to “foster
orderly reduction in the rate of inflation, while en-
couraging the resumption of sustainable economic
growth and attainment of reasonable equilibrium
in the country’s balance of payments.” 
Who knows? Perhaps these three objectives
might have been jointly attainable in the long run,
but for the short run they sound more like mother-
hood and apple pie. In the monetarist tradition of
the St. Louis Bank, it might have been preferable
to choose a money growth rate as an instrument
for achieving the strategic objectives. Nonetheless,
at least the Committee said it was guided by a con-
stant constellation of major stars in 1970 and 1971,
rather than focussing on every starlet going down
the street.
More evidence of the Committee’s movement
toward the maverick from St. Louis comes from
the second operating instruction paragraph of the
directive. Initially, it merely stated an objective for
money market conditions thought to be consistent
with expected growth paths of money and credit.
Frequently, this was conditioned on smoothing
the path for Treasury financing. Sometimes it even
was conditioned on evidence that money and credit
actually were following the Committee’s expected
paths. Darryl dissented in May 1970 because the
Committee’s expected paths for M1 growth seemed
excessive. 
Then the Committee took time out to deal
with a commercial paper crisis caused by the
bankruptcy of the Penn Central railroad. Concrete
evidence of movement came in December when
the Committee identified M1 as what it meant
when it mentioned money. This step toward the
maverick from St. Louis did not prevent Darryl
from dissenting. Having specified M1 as money, he
wanted less emphasis on bank credit. In addition,
he preferred a lower rate of M1 growth. He dis-
sented again at the January 1971 meeting and also
at the February meeting, which was the last of his
second voting term. He wanted less emphasis on
money market conditions in the operational in-
struction to the Trading Desk in New York.
A lot happened in the next two years. The
United States imposed wage and price controls in
a futile attempt to reduce inflation. It abandoned
official convertibility of the dollar into anything,
even for other central banks. And it devalued the
dollar twice in 14 months, from a nominal gold
content of 1/35 of an ounce to 1/42 of an ounce.
As Darryl began his third term as a voting
member, the Committee appeared to have moved
further in his direction, at least superficially. The
directive’s operational paragraph now instructed
the Desk to maintain bank reserves and money
market conditions consistent with expected paths,
or ranges, of M1 and M2. By the end of the year,
this operational instruction had become more
sharply defined, stating a range within which the
Desk might move the funds rate in response to
movements of the growth rates of M1 and M2 with-
in allowable ranges. 
In retrospect, this seems to have been closer to
a shell game than to an effective operating proce-
dure. That assessment might have been clear to
Darryl Francis at the July and August 1973 FOMC
meetings. In dissenting from the Committee’s in-
struction to the Desk at both of those meetings, he
pointed out that the growth ranges for M1 and M2
were inconsistent with the constraint placed on
movements in the funds rate.
Nonetheless, the procedure might have worked
had the Committee relaxed its constraint on the
funds rate when inconsistencies became apparent,
but that was almost never the case. The December
1973 meeting was a classic example. The oil crisis
was on; price pressures were apparent. Seeking the
best of both worlds, the Committee announced a
new strategic objective: policy was to resist infla-
tionary pressures and, at the same time, to cushion
the effects on production and employment grow-
ing out of the oil shortage. The directive called for
some easing in bank reserves and money market
conditions, provided that the monetary aggregates
did not appear to be growing excessively. By early
January 1974, the Committee was asked to increase
the inter-meeting limit on additions to the System
Open Market Account (SOMA) portfolio that became
necessary to accommodate excessive growth in the
aggregates. The majority agreed; Darryl Francis
dissented, arguing that banks should be forced to
borrow the needed extra reserves. 
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its allowable range and the aggregates above the
tops of their allowable ranges, the Committee
members had to choose which constraint to
honor. The majority agreed to obey the funds rate
constraint, rather than the monetary aggregate
constraint. Darryl Francis dissented. The rest is
history. Not until 1979 did the Committee finally
become persuaded that inflation was a monetary
phenomenon—that unless the growth of money
was brought down, the rate of inflation could not
be brought down. What might have been a modest
economic adjustment to lower money growth
after the petroleum crisis in 1973-74 in fact
became the very painful adjustment of 1979-82.
On reflection, Darryl Francis’s three-year mav-
erick voting record reveals a distinct pattern. In
1967-68, the Committee had no apparent anchor
to its decisions—not even maintaining the viability
of the international dollar standard. Darryl pointed
to an anchor—a stable trend growth rate of M1 that
was consistent with price stability. By 1970-71, the
Committee was moving in his direction, with an
unchanging set of strategic objectives and operating
expectations for M1 and M2 growth. By 1973-74,
the Committee faced the inconsistency between
its operating objectives for M1 and M2 and the
operating procedure it used to attain those objec-
tives. Despite Darryl Francis’s dissents, which
pointed out that the procedural emperor had no
clothes, the Committee went naked into most of
the remainder of the decade, setting an interest
rate without reckoning with the inflationary con-
sequences. To switch metaphors, push had come
to shove, and, until 1979, the Committee shoved
along the path Darryl Francis had tried to push
them off. 
I find several parallels between Darryl Francis’s
FOMC voting experience and more recent FOMC
experience. One is the importance to the Com-
mittee and to each potential maverick on the
Committee of maintaining an overriding strategic
objective for price stability. Unfortunately, as time
passed, Darryl’s lessons about monetary targets
seem to have become impossible to apply. At
present, the simple and appealing concept of
“money” has no generally accepted empirical
surrogate that can serve as a strategic objective
or an operating guide for policy. 
It is true, however, that we have been making
progress over the past decade in rebuilding a
regime in which people believe that any increase
in inflation and interest rates is temporary, and
that the longer-term trend is toward price stability.
Nevertheless, an unfortunate tendency persists in
the financial press to assert that the Fed seeks to
slow growth in order to prevent inflation—in spite
of every current FOMC member having declared
that growth does not cause inflation and that the
ultimate objective of monetary policy is to maxi-
mize long-run growth by preserving a stable
purchasing power of money. 
Declaring that growth does not cause inflation
did not prevent some Fed-watchers from viewing
each increase in the Committee’s funds rate target
in 1999 and 2000 as a potential assault on the
longevity of the longest economic recovery on
record. In my view, however, the environment of
rapid technological innovation and increased pro-
ductivity had a crucial impact on monetary policy
that must be recognized if we are to understand a
second parallel to Darryl Francis’s maverick tenure
on the FOMC: Raising a nominal overnight inter-
bank rate does not necessarily ensure a restrictive
policy. In the 60s and 70s, policy was not restrictive
because the inflation premium in interest rates was
rising faster than the Committee was raising the
overnight policy rate. In the 1999-2000 environ-
ment, raising the overnight policy rate did not
indicate that the stance of policy had become more
restrictive if the real return to capital was rising
faster than the policy rate. Let me explain.
All of us probably are familiar with the idea
that household consumption behavior tends to
reflect expectations about longer-term ability to
consume. This phenomenon has been called the
life-cycle hypothesis, standard or standardized
income, and, of course, permanent income by
Milton Friedman in the Theory of the Consumption
Function.
The basic idea is familiar. Transitory changes
in measured income or cash flow fluctuate around
some longer-term average; household consumption
behavior does not fully reflect these transitory
changes in the short run. Sharp increases in
measured income are not fully reflected in corre-
sponding increases in current consumption—nor
are sudden rapid declines in measured income
reflected in corresponding declines in consumption
spending.
Both the theoretical framework and empirical
observations traditionally suggest that permanent
income is relatively steady, while transitory changes
in measured income are more variable. However, it
can also be the case that periods of rising produc-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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tivity and significant technological innovation pro-
duce a generalized perception that permanent
income is rising relative to measured income.
People may come to form this expectation in
a variety of ways. Sustained periods of steady
employment and growing paychecks may lead
people to expect that not only has their real stan-
dard of living risen, but it will continue to rise in
the future—possibly at a faster rate than previously
expected. Or, they may come to expect fewer or
shorter periods of unemployment. Or, they may
observe that their 401K savings plans or defined-
contribution retirement programs now promise a
higher future stream of income than previously
thought. In a variety of ways, people come to
expect that they will be able to consume more in
the present, as well as in the future, than they pre-
viously thought.
As a result of any (or some combination) of
these various forces in the “new economy” environ-
ment, households perceive that their long-term
ability to consume is higher. In economists’ lan-
guage, they have moved to a higher indifference
curve. 
In the business or entrepreneurial sector, rising
productivity and an enhanced pace of technological
innovation mean that the marginal efficiency of
capital is higher. Again in economists’ jargon, the
production possibility boundary has both shifted
out and changed its shape, offering more tomorrow
in return for giving up consumption today. Real
interest rates rise as new opportunities bring a
higher rate of return on new business investment.
These higher real interest rates are not a matter
of policy choice or of anyone’s discretion. Rather
they are a manifestation of economic forces that
result in better uses for available productive re-
sources. With households and businesses both
increasing their claims on current productive
resources, real interest rates must rise in competi-
tive markets.
Higher real interest rates need not imply higher
nominal interest rates. Just to exclude complications
for the moment, consider the case under a gold
standard. Increased productivity and technological
innovation would exert downward pressure on the
prices of some goods. Institutionalized monetary
stability implied by a gold standard means that the
price level falls. Thus, the purchasing power of
money rises in the face of greater productivity.
The falling price level means that greater per-
manent real income can be distributed to society
with the same level of nominal income. The fall-
ing price level also implies that unchanged
nominal interest rates, or possibly even some-
what lower nominal interest rates, correspond to
higher real interest rates. These higher real rates
are the essential market mechanism by which
competition between consumers and investors
rations present consumption against augmented
future consumption.
But we’re not on a gold standard. What happens
in a discretionary monetary policy regime using
an interest-rate-pegging procedure? The upward
pressure on real interest rates that is a necessary
consequence of greater productivity and the faster
pace of technological innovation initially puts
upward pressure on nominal interest rates. Greater
and greater injections of central bank money then
are necessary to keep the pegged level of the nom-
inal overnight interbank rate unchanged. Rising
market interest rates mean that the opportunity
cost of holding money balances is rising. That, in
turn, means the quantity of money demanded
declines and the income velocity of money rises.
This combination of a higher trend growth of
velocity and the faster growth of central bank
money means that a higher rate of nominal final-
demand growth is accommodated by a more
expansionary rate of money growth.
In such an environment the increase in nom-
inal interest rates—while initially reflecting upward
pressure on real interest rates—will be augmented
by a rising inflation premium. The overnight inter-
bank rate is under persistent upward pressure so
long as it continues to lag behind market-determined
interest rates.
This dynamic process describes an environment
in which acceleration in the pace of technological
innovation and productivity can inadvertently be-
come an inflationary process. The central bank’s
passive maintenance of an unchanged overnight
rate accommodates nominal price increases by
failing to accommodate real interest rate increases.
As a result, credit markets are unable to play their
role in rationing available real productive resources
amongst heightened competing demands that
reflect the increased return to real capital. 
If that description of policymaking in a period
of accelerating productivity growth makes me seem
like a maverick, I’m happy to wear the label. 
This brings me to the third and final parallel I
see between Darryl Francis’s experience with
policy implementation and today’s experience.22 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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Each member of the Committee is, by design, an
independent free agent. While the will of the
majority always prevails, each member must be
prepared respectfully to disagree. As Darryl
demonstrated, the maverick, the dissenter, the
sometimes-lonely voice in the crowd, plays a vital
role in the continuing evolution of policy thinking
and policy making. We all salute him for his
courage during an exceptionally challenging
period of our central bank’s history. 